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The years 1943-1944 were the turning point in the carrying of the Second World 
War, the United Nations’ troops managing to take the strategic initiative on the 
front due to significant human and material resources at stake. The political and 
military disaster that Romania was heading to would impose the need of 
reorienting its foreign policy, aiming at the country’s swift removal from the war 
and the signing of the armistice. (Baciu, 1996, pp. 103-104) 
Considerable deterioration of the military situation on the eastern front, 
materialized in the Red Army’s sustained offensive, would strengthen the ties 
between the leaders of political parties and would achieve the "united opposition” 
seeking through various diplomatic channels, to obtain favourable conditions for 
Romania in order to sign the armistice. The opposition’s diplomatic action had the 
support of King Michael, but the initiatives for signing the peace were conducted 
simultaneously by the regime from Bucharest as well, which, through direct 
negotiations with the Allies had the same political purposes. In March, the Soviet 
troops had already reached in some sectors Nistru’s bank line, thus making the 
Romanian authorities to be increasingly concerned with the possibility of 
transforming Romania in a theatre of war, the attitude expressing faithfully the 
fears both of civilians and of the political class. 
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Romania's international political position in the first days after the coup d’état on 
23 August and the turning of weapons against Germany, was that of an 
"independent state fighting a war against its former allies, (Deletant, 1997, p. 40) 
but now on the side of his former enemies, having a part of its territory militarily 
occupied. The Soviet Army would find in Bucharest an independent government, 
able and willing to sign an armistice, having as main advantages the neutralization 
of the German troops and the liberation of an important part of the national 
territory1. (Quinlan, 1995, pp. 98-99) If somehow the Soviets had other plans2 for 
Romania,3 (Şperlea, 1997, p. 47) they would be confused with the action of King 
Michael, who had managed to change the course of events by arresting the 
Marshall. The intention of the new Romanian authorities was to sign the agreement 
with the United Nations as soon as possible in order to avoid having the whole 
country under the Red Army’s military control and occupation. Raised to power in 
pretty exceptional circumstances, the new government led by General Sănătescu 
would proceed the swift initiation of the process for signing the armistice with the 
United Nations (the Soviets having the priority) by sending to Moscow, on 28 
August a delegation empowered to do so. The delay of negotiations due to the 
Soviet Union Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, and also 
that with respect to signing the Armistice Agreement would further complicate 
Romania’s political and military situation at the date for signing the Convention, 
thus being put de facto and de jure under the occupation of an enemy army4. 
Romania's new political orientation, announced by the royal proclamation would 
enjoy nation’s total adhesion because, the natural consequence of this new 
situation, was giving the opportunity "to liberate the land of our Transylvania from 
foreign occupation." (România, marele sacrificat al celui de al doilea război 
                                                          
1
 The war communiqués of the Red Army evoked the battles for the liberation of certain regions, even 
of the capital, taking hold of the entire merit, although these had been already liberated by the 
Romanian troops. Admittedly, after the  liberation of Paris by the Anglo-American allies, on the 
western front, the Soviets were looking to impress at their turn with “the liberation of Bucharest”. 
2
 The scenario for seizing control of the state from Central and South –Eastern Europe would be 
conceived and unfolded almost identically, the countries liberated by the Soviet Army, would have to 
“bear” the communist parties raised to power, extensively supported by the Soviet Union.  
3
 The formation of volunteers units, the unabating activity of the Russian group of the Communist 
Party and the bringing of the volunteers unit “Tudor Vladimirescu”, were sufficient clues revealing 
the true intentions of the Soviets. These took the Soviet Union by surprise, which had to use the 
longer road to get to dug-out and to respect the terms of the Armistice Agreement. (Duţu, Dobre, & 
Leonida, 2000, pp. 198-201). 
4
 The English had agreed with the Soviets upon holding the prerogatives of the Armistice with 
Romania since May 1944 receiving this way the “affairs from Greece”, thus the delay with respect to 
signing the Armistice by the Russians was followed by an extremely simple calculation having in 
view the post war situation. To the discussions on various topics and expressed on the diplomatic 
channels of the Romanian Government and of the opposition emissaries till 23 August there were also 
included technical aspects, the Romanian delegation left for Moscow signing the Armistice with a 
curious delay on 12 September, 1944. (Baciu, 1996). 
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mondial. Documente, 1994, pp. 251-252) The Armistice Convention concluded 
between Romania, on one hand, and the United Nations, on the other hand, was not 
in the opinion of many Romanian politicians, the most eagerly expected document 
by the Romanian authorities and opposition during the secret negotiations in Cairo, 
Ankara or Stockholm. The formula of "unconditional surrender", adopted on 24 
January 1943 in Casablanca would have the role of preparing the governments at 
war with the United Nations on the treatment and conditions their countries would 
be subject to, irrespective of the causes determining the output of their struggle. 
For Romania, the conditions of surrender were, among others, demobilization and 
disarmament, reparations etc., all these being imposed by the Big Three and 
"designed" primarily for assuring security and further continuation of the war 
against Germany, goals considered to have significant political implications." (23 
august 1944. Documente, vol 1, pp. 66-70) 
Romania's taking part with the Allied and Associated Powers was conditioned by 
the signing of the Armistice on 12 September 1944, fact which would primarily 
involve long term economic and political costs for the Romanian state, the 
Convention representing at the same time the basis of discussions for the future 
Peace Treaty from Paris in 1946. Containing a preamble, 20 articles and 6 annexes 
comprising the areas of order, politics, army, economics, finance and 
administration, (Mureşan & Mureşan, 2003) the Convention Act would highly 
contribute to the diminishing of Romania’s potential, this being written and 
interpreted very hostile to Romania. The basis of economic stipulations which 
Romania must have met was the article 11 of the Armistice Agreement. According 
to this, the Romanian side was obliged to pay 300 million dollars as war indemnity 
in products, the rates being spaced out on six calendar years with the statement that 
if the payment schedule was not respected there could be taken up penalties of 5% 
from the remaining balance for every month of delay. (România, marele sacrificat 
al celui de al doilea război mondial. Documente, 1994, pp. 312) The Annex D of 
the agreement would impose explicit clarifications with respect to the U.S.’ dollar 
parity, meaning $ 35 per ounce of gold right from the day of the signing act. 
Equally, the other articles of the Armistice Agreement called on a significant 
budgetary effort for the Romanian State. Thus, although Romania's participation 
was recognized in the anti-Nazi war, starting from 24 August 1944, however, the 
Article no. 3, mentioned that Romania would provide the Soviet and Allied forces 
with the entire contest...... on its expense. (România, marele sacrificat al celui de al 
doilea război mondial. Documente, 1994, pp. 311-312) "For the proper functioning 
of the armistice, there was stipulated the founding of an Allied Control 
Commission in accordance with the Chapter no.18 which "would take upon itself 
the regulation and control of the execution till the conclusion of peace.....". The 
activity of this institution would deeply damage the Romanian state due to 
interferences in the internal administration and unfavourable interpretation of the 
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Armistice’provisions. (Şandru, 2007, pp. 137-142) Given this circumstance, the 
Romanian authorities would be obliged to establish the Romanian Commission for 
the Application of the Armistice, a new institution entitled to fully cooperate with 
the Allied authorities (Soviet). Its president, I Cristu, would constantly inform the 
Romanian authorities about the abuses of the Allied (Soviet) Commission of 
Control with respect to the execution of obligations deriving from the Armistice 
Agreement. (Şandru, 2007, p. 150) 
The evaluations of the Soviet party started from pretty erroneous calculations 
which had in view Great Romania’s potential before the World War I and which 
ciphered the state’s annual income at about 2 billion dollars. In the new context, 
given the loss of one third of the national territory, the endurance of a substantial 
economic war effort (about 1 billion U.S. dollars by August 1944) and the 
rendering to its neighbors of 6 million people, the state’s revenues had been 
estimated, at about $ 600 million, (România, marele sacrificat al celui de al doilea 
război mondial. Documente, 1994, pp. 308) but they had also been forecast to a 
decrease fact which later on was proven out by the internal official evaluations1. 
(Constantinescu, 2000, p. 93) It should be emphasized that the simultaneous 
fulfillment of all obligations imposed by the Convention was quite difficult 
because the infrastructure and entire economic potential had to be put at the service 
of the Red Army, with respect to the front necessities and what was superfluous 
these were allocated to the Romanian army and eventually to fulfil the economic 
obligations the Convention. (Constantinescu, 2000, p. 83) 
The Armistice signed between Romania and the United Nations on 12 September 
1944 would represent the overall framework for the unfolding of Romania's 
military campaign against Germany and its satellites. The implementation of its 
terms was the responsibility of the Allied (Soviet) Commission of control, which 
according to the agreements of the Big Three would throw Romania into the arms 
of the Soviet Union. Its representatives’ brutal interference would highly affect the 
internal political events disturbing at the same time the state’s budget through 
massive withdrawals of goods seized on the basis of the Armistice Agreement. 
No less important would be in the future the economic costs of war held against 
Germany, the date of August 23, 1944 finding Romania’s economy controlled by 
German capital, the German debts owed to the Romanian state being calculated at 
1.5 billion German marks. The mobilization of a large military contingent would 
weaken Romania’s industrial production, bound to maintain the same levels of 
production this time with substantial efforts. Furthermore, the economic transition 
would channel important financial and economic resources which were normally 
intended for other purposes, the maintenance of the Romanian troops requiring 
                                                          
1
 According to a study conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the values of the state’s revenues 
were estimated in 1945 at 537 millions $. 
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significant costs. (Constantinescu, 2000, p. 66) The allied bombing, carried out 
mostly on the vitally important economic centres, would cause considerable losses 
to the Romanian economy, especially to the oil industry there simultaneously 
occurring a large number of casualties. Among indirect deficits caused to the 
Romanian economy there are to be mentioned, first and foremost, non-equivalent 
exchanges of currency between the two countries, the German mark artificially 
increasing against the Romanian leu, thus resulting in an unjustified price increase 
for products imported from Germany in comparison with the Romanian exported 
goods (Constantinescu, 2000) and an increased purchasing power of German 
soldiers as well who "depleted" the Romanian market of certain products by 
artificially increasing their price. 
The maintenance of the German troops on the Romanian territory, the payment 
system, the deductions resulting from transport and communication activities 
would be other "hot spots" of the collaboration with the Third Reich in the anti-
Soviet war. While the German military units and import-export companies were 
making supplies with minimum costs for first necessity products, the goods 
imported from Germany were absolutely irrelevant to the Romanian market’s 
needs, these being sold at inflated prices. Romania's complex situation 
internationally made it extremely vulnerable to the claims of its German ally who 
was fully aware of the groundless adverse reactions of such economic cooperation 
with the Romanian side. All these reasons, shading the Romanian-German 
cooperation, resulted from the fact that, once having accepted to participate in the 
military campaign from the east, the Romanian authorities had missed "small 
details of the cooperation", although Romania’s legal situation was similar to an 
independent and sovereign state fighting against a common enemy. 
The royal decision for achieving the volta-face as soon as possible was a real 
general surprise for the international diplomatic circles, this being mainly 
motivated by the need to avoid transforming the country into a theatre of war, fact 
which would have had one of the most unfortunate consequences on the civil 
population and on the economy as well. The act itself was a very good short term 
initiative; however, the deriving consequences would be harmful in terms of 
domestic and international policy. The benefits brought to the Allied cause were 
huge, somehow inversely proportional- some critics say - to those acquired by 
Romania. Without neglecting the importance of regaining North Transylvania, one 
can say that the price paid by the Romanian side was unfairly high, great sacrifices 
being made, both on the front and on the inside for the years that had come. 
Although Romania’s economic war effort, estimated to the enormous amount of 
1,200,000,000 dollars (acc. to the currency in 1938), had situated it on the fourth 
place in the hierarchy of the United Nations fighting against Germany, its justly 
deserve co-belligerent status would be denied for political reasons known only to 
the Great Powers. Of all the states which were are in a situation somehow similar 
ŒCONOMICA 
 
 136
to that of Romania’s, none of them made the military or economic effort at the 
same scale as Romania did in defeating the Nazi war machine1. 
Though fluctuant, due to the Romanian-Soviet military protocol signed on 26 
October, the Romanian military manpower engaged in the theatre of operations 
would be placed permanently over the minima imposed by the Armistice 
Convention. Furthermore, Romania's contribution was total2, the authorities and the 
population making considerable efforts for supporting the military campaign of the 
Romanian troops. No military organization, troops or any other type of associations 
or military units continued fighting against the United Nations after the turning 
over of weapons against Germany on 23 August. For instance, Italy contributed 
with 100,000 supporters to the cause of the United Nations, while five infantry 
divisions and two aviation squadrons continued fighting in Northern Italy on 
Germany’s side. In the case of Hungary, there were 10 divisions, Bulgaria - a pro-
fascist division, Yugoslavia - three divisions, nine brigades plus a guard division 
and one of cavalry In France, the number of allies who continued fighting was 
amounted to that of a fast and divisions, and in Poland, about 20 to 25,000 
soldiers3. The Memorandum submitted by Romania at the Peace Conference from 
Paris, recalled, in addition to the military and economic war effort made directly by 
our country, the amount of the obligations fulfilled by 1 July 1945, on the basis of 
Article no. 3 of the Convention, this being numbered to 77 billion lei (currency 
from1938). 
The services brought to the Allied cause cost Romanian state significant material 
reserves, not to mention the number of lost lives among the Romanian Army. The 
calculations showed that Romanian’s economic effort after August 1944 amounted 
to $ 1.5 billion (1938) allocated only for the implementation of the Convention’s 
provisions and 1.2 billion dollars for the war effort4. (Mureşan & Mureşan, 2003, 
pp. 358)The real costs of Romania's participation in the anti Hitlerite war placed 
Romania on a respectable fourth place in the hierarchy of states participating in the 
war against Germany, before France, Yugoslavia and Australia. 
  
                                                          
1
 A.N.I.C.B., Fund of Royal House, file no. 21/1945, f 1-12. 
2
  Ministry of National Defence Archives fund 948, file no.177, passim. 
3
 Idem, file 151, f 105-110. 
4
 To these sums there are also added approximately 1 billion $ spent on the campaign in August 1944. 
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